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“HEAL THYSELF.”*—AN ARGUMENT FOR
GRANTING ASYLUM TO HEALTHCARE
WORKERS PERSECUTED DURING THE
2014 WEST AFRICAN EBOLA CRISIS
Bethany Echols**
ABSTRACT
This article argues for a change in United States asylum policy at a time
when change is needed most. Those seeking asylum must prove that they
fear persecution in their home country based on one of five protected cate-
gories and that their government is the persecutor or is unable to control
the actions of the persecutors. Multiple articles have recognized that the
“particular social group” is the most difficult category of asylum seeker to
analyze. Not only do the standards for particular social groups (PSGs)
vary among circuit courts, but judicial consistency is lacking.
This article focuses on a particular PSG, healthcare workers from re-
cently Ebola-stricken West Africa. During the 2014 Ebola crisis, these
healthcare workers faced discrimination and violence due to their associa-
tion with western medicine. Hospitals were frequently threatened and ran-
sacked. Multiple accounts of violence against local and international
healthcare workers were recorded by Doctors Against Borders, the Centers
for Disease Control, and the international media. However, because of the
inconsistencies in asylum law and the ever-present political influence in
what originates as a humanitarian process, it is unlikely for these PSGs to
be found asylum-eligible. This highlights the need for a more consistent
and humanitarian-based asylum policy with less political influence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE world’s largest Ebola outbreak began in West Africa in 2014.1From 2014 to 2016, an estimated 28,616 cases of infection werereported in multiple countries around the world, resulting in
11,310 deaths.2 The outbreak primarily hit West Africa—specifically the
countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.3 Not only was this area
ill-equipped to respond to the crisis, but political action and cultural dif-
ferences engendered hatred for practitioners of Western medicine among
1. See generally Ebola Outbreaks 2000-2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PRE-
VENTION [hereinafter Ebola Outbreaks], https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/
summaries.html [https://perma.cc/3MNH-MBFY] (last updated July 28, 2017).
2. Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html [https://per
ma.cc/8RFK-H3UW] (last updated July 28, 2017).
3. Id.
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West Africans, which lead to widespread violence against local and inter-
national healthcare professionals.4 Though the widespread Ebola out-
break ended in 2016,5 the stigma remains and has left many local
healthcare professionals with no choice but to leave their country.
United States asylum law requires a person seeking asylum to be a ref-
ugee who has been persecuted or fears persecution because of “race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”6 Of all protected characteristics, membership in a particular so-
cial group has been the least well-defined and most difficult to achieve.
Not unlike much of asylum law, Immigration Judge and Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) decisions regarding particular social group status
have varied dramatically over time and each federal court of appeals has
interpreted BIA decisions differently.7 Much of the variety in particular
social group decisions has been based on the interpretation of require-
ments for particular social group status, namely (1) social visibility, (2)
particularity, and (3) the definition of “past persecution.” Because of
these difficulties, very few particular social groups are consistently
recognized.
This article focuses on these inconsistent asylum decisions, judicial dis-
cretion, and a lack of clear interpretive rules as the barriers to the ever-
elusive particular social group status. The lack of consistent decisions has
provided a less than reliable precedent for asylum seekers. The changing
political climate and the stronghold that political influence plays in asy-
lum decision making and discretion has also prevented asylum for those
who may have previously been granted asylum. Additionally, a misguided
reliance on State Department-created country conditions information has
led to the denial of asylum due to the belief that the persecution has
ended. Part II of this article briefly summarizes the historical background
of Western African medicine, the 2014 Ebola crisis, and the persecution
faced by healthcare workers. Part III introduces the historical back-
ground and development of asylum law, analyzes its current application
and issues with inconsistency, defining its requirements, discretion, and
political influence. Part IV introduces and critiques the development of
the particular social group in U.S. asylum in comparison to international
asylum law, its requirements, and its often-inconsistent rulings. Part V
constructs a particular social group for Ebola crisis healthcare workers
4. Terrence McCoy, Why the Brutal Murder of Several Ebola Workers May Hint at
More Violence to Come, WASH. POST: MORNING MIX (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/19/why-the-brutal-murder-of-eight-ebola-
workers-may-hint-at-more-violence-to-come/?utm_term=.164eac174661.
5. Ebola Outbreaks, supra note 1; see also ACAPS, EBOLA OUTBREAK IN WEST AF-
RICA: CHALLENGES TO THE REINTEGRATION OF AFFECTED GROUPS INTO COMMUNITIES 1
(Nov. 11, 2015).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
7. Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of
M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. 2 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter
Applying for Asylum], https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
PSG%20Practice%20Advisory%20and%20Appendices-Final-1.22.16.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FV83-24C8].
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using current standards and suggests that the inconsistencies of asylum
law and particular social group determinations be remedied by following
international precedent, ridding judicial discretion of political bias, and
applying analogous arguments from currently recognized particular social
groups.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WEST AFRICAN HEALTH CARE
AND THE 2014 EBOLA CRISIS
A. HEALTH CARE IN WEST AFRICA AND THE ENDURING DISTRUST
OF WESTERN MEDICINE
“I often say a great doctor kills more people than a great general.”8
In 2004, Western-trained doctors and medical workers were sentenced
to death on charges of intentionally infecting Libyan children with
H.I.V.9 For years, Africans have feared Western medicine and healthcare
providers on the belief that they intentionally administer “deadly agents
under the guise of providing health care.”10 Well-published events going
back to the 1970s have rooted this fear of Western medicine throughout
Africa.11 This distrust led to a fear of seeking preventative and curative
medicine.12 Many avoid entering hospitals for fear of contracting diseases
or being intentionally infected.13 This distrust also encourages the use of
traditional medicines and healthcare methods, which lead to the precise
results the African community hopes to avoid: the spread of disease, in-
fection, and death.14
The World Health Organization (WHO) states that a minimum of 2.5
health workers is necessary for every 1,000 people for healthcare systems
to be stable.15 According to WHO, the West African countries of Guinea,
Sierra Leone, and Liberia all have a median age of 19 and an overall life
expectancy around age fifty.16 The most common causes of death are
8. PETER MCDONALD, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MEDICAL QUOTATIONS 59
(2004) (attributed to Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, 1646–1716).
9. Harriet A. Washington, Why Africa Fears Western Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (July 31,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31/opinion/31washington.html [https://perma.cc/
PE58-QERG].
10. Id. at ¶ 1.
11. Id. at ¶ 4.
12. Id. at ¶¶ 5–6.
13. Attacks on Health Facilities, Staff, Patients: Lack of Monitoring, Protection, Justice
Impede Access, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 20, 2015, 1:00 AM) [hereinafter Attacks on
Health Facilities], https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/20/attacks-health-facilities-staff-pa
tients [https://perma.cc/H7M5-PLA6]; Emergencies Preparedness, Response: Factors That
Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus and Impeded Rapid Containment,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 2015) [hereinafter Emergencies Prepared-
ness], http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/en/ [https://perma.cc/
LRA3-4W4P].
14. Emergencies Preparedness, supra note 13.
15. Health Workforce Requirements for Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable
Development Goals, 17 HUMAN RESOURCES FOR HEALTH OBSERVER [WHO] 8, 10 (2016),
http://www.who.int/hrh/resources/health-observer17/en/.
16. Liberia: WHO Statistical Profile, WHO (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/gho/coun
tries/lbr.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/2FGG-RW5U]; Guinea: WHO Statistical Profile, WHO
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lower respiratory infections (i.e., pneumonia or bronchitis), human im-
munodeficiency virus (H.I.V.), tuberculosis, and malaria, among other in-
fectious diseases.17 Most of these are easily prevented or treated by
vaccines, antibiotics, or other medications. However, current WHO
health reports state that Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia “have the
lowest human development indexes and [are] among the weakest health
system infrastructures in the world.”18 In each of these countries, the
health workforce density was, at most, less than 3.7 healthcare workers
per 10,000 people, a dramatic disparity from WHO’s minimum.19 World
Bank reported one doctor for every 70,000 people in Liberia, every
45,000 in Sierra Leone, and every 10,000 in Guinea—compared to one for
every 410 people in the U.S.20 The lack of essential elements in the public
health system infrastructure, health workforce, and government funding
has often left these countries vulnerable to serious and life-threatening
diseases.21 Because of a lack of government resources and trained doctors
who choose to stay and practice in their home countries, as well as the
cultural background of the community, Western medicine is not widely
successful.22
B. THE EBOLA CRISIS OF 2014
1. Ebola
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Ebola Virus Dis-
ease (Ebola) is “a rare and deadly disease” caused by a viral infection,
often fatal to humans.23 Ebola was discovered in 1976 near the Ebola
River, and four of the five virus strains occur in animal hosts native to
Africa.24 Ebola is contracted through direct contact with broken skin or
mucous membranes or with blood or bodily fluids of a person who is sick
or has died from Ebola.25 One can also contract Ebola through contact
with objects contaminated with such bodily fluids, infected animals, and
(Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/gho/countries/gin.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/ZWA8-
QMN9]; Sierra Leone: WHO Statistical Profile, WHO (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/gho/
countries/sle.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/36N4-BF5S].
17. See supra note 16.
18. Haitham Shoman et al., The Link Between the West African Ebola Outbreak and
Health Systems in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Systematic Review, 13 GLOBALIZA-
TION AND HEALTH 1, 2 (Jan. 4, 2017), http://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-016-0224-2 [https://per
ma.cc/UYK7-LNSU].
19. See id.
20. Nassos Stylianou, How World’s Worst Ebola Outbreak Began with One Boy’s
Death, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014, 12:32 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
30199004 [https://perma.cc/HV62-THLY].
21. Id.
22. Emergencies Preparedness, supra note 13.
23. About Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION [herein-
after About Ebola], https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/about.html [https://perma.cc/C9F2-
T4F8] (last updated Dec. 27, 2017); see also Ebola Virus Disease, WHO [hereinafter Ebola
Virus Disease], http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ [https://perma.cc/
G5PR-SZGX] (last updated Jan. 2018).
24. About Ebola, supra note 23.
25. Id.
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possibly through unprotected sex.26 Symptoms of Ebola include fever, se-
vere headache, muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, diarrhea, vomiting, ab-
dominal pain, and unexpected internal and external bleeding.27 Humans
are not infectious until they develop symptoms, which appear within two
to twenty-one days after exposure.28 Diagnosis must be done through
careful laboratory testing to prevent transmission by healthcare profes-
sionals who can distinguish the symptoms from similar infectious diseases
that plague West Africa, such as malaria and typhus.29
Since Ebola is a virus, there are no antibiotics that can treat it.30 Addi-
tionally, unlike influenza or H.I.V., there are no FDA approved vaccines
or antivirals available to treat Ebola.31 Therefore, recovery depends on
supportive care, provided in a sterile and reactive hospital setting to pre-
vent further infection, and the patient’s own immune response.32 The av-
erage fatality rate of Ebola is 50%.33 Both the CDC and WHO agree that
preventing Ebola infection and transmission relies on maintaining careful
hygiene; avoiding contact with the infected and items they have come in
contact with; avoiding funeral or burial rituals that require the handling
of a body; and raising awareness of symptoms, risk factors, and protective
measures through community engagement.34
2. The 2014 West African Outbreak
The 2014 West African Ebola outbreak was the largest in history.35 The
outbreak “killed five times more than all other known [ ] outbreaks com-
bined” and was the deadliest since its discovery.36 The outbreak started in
December 2013 when a two-year-old in Guinea contracted Ebola and
died, spreading the disease to his family and his village.37 It lasted until
26. Id.
27. Signs and Symptoms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www




30. Be Antibiotics Aware: Smart Use, Best Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, www.cdc.gov/features/antibioticuse/index.html [https://perma.cc/C4AB-T4FV]
(last updated Dec. 15, 2017).
31. Treatment, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/treatment/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y7N9-9RFQ] (last updated July 22, 2015).
32. Id.
33. Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 23.
34. Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
vhf/ebola/prevention/index.html [https://perma.cc/L92N-WPJX] (last updated July 22,
2015); Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 23.
35. Ebola Outbreaks, supra note 1.
36. Ebola: Mapping the Outbreak, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Mapping the
Outbreak], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28755033 [https://perma.cc/3E9G-
L4BG].
37. Holly Yan & Esprit Smith, Ebola: Who is Patient Zero? Disease Traced Back to 2-
Year-Old in Guinea, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015, 6:40 PM), www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/health/ebola-
patient-zero/index.html [https://perma.cc/7VV3-FP8X].
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2016 when the last cases in three particular countries were reported.38
The epidemic perpetuated further issues with local healthcare systems,
education, and the economy.39 Ebola spread easily throughout communi-
ties in West Africa because of damage to public health infrastructure,
poor transportation and communication systems, a porous local and in-
ternational border, and cultural beliefs.40 Urban centers also played a
role in transmission, most notably in Sierra Leone.41
3. Government and International Relief Group Actions
In response to the crisis, West African governments passed laws closing
the borders, quarantining areas of the country, reducing access to health
care, and subjecting those who treated themselves at home or buried
loved ones to face legal consequences.42 Multiple international relief or-
ganizations dispatched healthcare and aid workers to combat the disease,
educate the community, and raise awareness.43 Many international
human rights organizations have considered the actions of the West Afri-
can governments to be violations of human rights. These heavy restric-
tions also bred fear and resentment in the affected communities.44
4. Societal Reactions
Efforts by local governments and international health organizations to
control Ebola and educate the community were hindered by the resis-
tance from local communities, who have a history of suspicion towards
outside intervention.45 West Africans, who lacked much understanding of
the virus, feared that the government and the West had introduced this
disease into their communities.46 People refused to go to the hospital,
38. Situation Report: Ebola Virus Disease, WHO (Jun. 10, 2016), http://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/10665/208883/1/ebolasitrep_10Jun2016_eng.pdf?ua=1; Ebola: Mapping the
Outbreak, supra note 36.
39. See West Africa: Respect Rights in Ebola Response, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 15,
2014, 9:59 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/15/west-africa-respect-rights-ebola-re
sponse [https://perma.cc/NCC8-BYWM].
40. See Emergencies Preparedness, supra note 13.
41. See Ebola Crisis: Sierra Leone Law Makes Hiding Patients Illegal, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Ebola Crisis: Sierra Leone], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-28914791 [https://perma.cc/YN4L-2ZB5].
42. Id.; Monica Mark, West African Countries Announce New Measures to Stop Ebola
Spread, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2014, 14:41), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/
jul/28/west-africa-measures-stop-ebola-spread [https://perma.cc/7P3F-J6NG].
43. Ebola, DRS. WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/our-work/
medical-issues/ebola; Ebola Virus Disease, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact
sheets/fs103/en/ [https://perma.cc/3JME-DZE8] (last updated Jan. 2018).
44. Monica Mark, West African Countries Announce New Measures to Stop Ebola
Spread, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2014, 2:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/
2014/jul/28/west-africa-measures-stop-ebola-spread [https://perma.cc/7P3F-J6NG].
45. Nassos Stylianou, How World’s Worst Ebola Outbreak Began with One Boy’s
Death, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30199004
[https://perma.cc/HV62-THLY].
46. See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2015/16: THE STATE OF
THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 319 (2016).
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preferring at-home treatment.47 This fear only made access to healthcare
even worse.48
Violence against Western healthcare workers, hospitals, and health or-
ganization workers started during the crisis.49 International healthcare
workers, local hospitals and staff, and those responsible for burying the
dead were all targeted for violence.50 In Guinea, doctors and aides from
Doctors Without Borders/Me´decins Sans Frontie`res were met at the edge
of a community by men with machetes and guns.51 They were later found
dead, having been dragged off the road and killed.52 In Sierra Leone, a
hospital was surrounded by an angry mob who threatened to burn it
down and remove the patients. In Liberia, armed men attacked a quaran-
tine clinic, which led to the escape of thirty patients and looting of in-
fected items from the clinic.53 Hospitals and clinics were attacked and
avoided.54 Regardless of a doctor or nurse’s duty to care for the ill, the
stigma and violence caused many to leave work—especially the fear of
retributive violence from the families of the deceased.
5. Stigma and Persecution Continue
“Where there’s a doctor it is always a bad sign.
Even when they are not doing the killing themselves
it means a death is close . . . .”55
According to the U.S. State Department Reports for 2015 and 2016,
stigma and discrimination against Ebola survivors and medical respond-
ers still remains.56 WHO has created a project in Sierra Leone to rebuild
47. Ebola Crisis: Sierra Leone, supra note 41; Monica Mark, West African Countries
Announce New Measures to Stop Ebola Spread, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 28, 2014, 2:41 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/jul/28/west-africa-measures-stop-ebola-spread
[https://perma.cc/7P3F-J6NG].
48. Mark, supra note 47.
49. Adam Nossiter, Fear of Ebola Breeds a Terror of Physicians, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/world/africa/ebola-epidemic-west-africa-guinea
.html?mcubz=3 [http://perma.cc/3TEW-DTZ5]; Attacks on Health Facilities, supra note 13.
50. Terrence McCoy, Why the Brutal Murder of Several Ebola Workers May Hint at
More Violence to Come, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/19/why-the-brutal-murder-of-eight-ebola-workers-may-
hint-at-more-violence-to-come/?utm_term=.a85dc6fc1020 [perma.cc/TZ99-9CWN]; Jacque
Wilson, 8 Killed in Guinea Town Over Ebola Fears, CNN (Sept. 19, 2015, 3:18 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/health/ebola-guinea-killing/index.html [perma.cc/3KAZ-WK6M].
51. Wilson, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Attacks on Health Facilities, supra note 13.
54. Report: Armed Men Attack Liberia Ebola Clinic, Freeing Patients, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 17, 2014, 3:45 PM) [hereinafter Armed Men Attack], https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
report-armed-men-attack-liberia-ebola-clinic-freeing-patients/ [http://perma.cc/V4UX-
NSUY].
55. MARGARET ATWOOD, ALIAS GRACE 27 (1996).
56. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports for
Human Rights Practices for 2015: Guinea 27 (2015); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of De-
mocracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 2015: Liberia 23
(2015); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports for
Human Rights Practices for 2015: Sierra Leone 12 (2015); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of
Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 2016: Guinea
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trust within communities towards this affected group.57 It also continues
to focus on disease and prevention education.58 Regardless of these con-
tinuing efforts, West African healthcare providers have arrived in the
United States seeking asylum from the violence and stigma.
III. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
The origin of United States asylum law traces back to the founding and
settling of the country by immigrants, as well as the belief in the “Ameri-
can Dream.”59 Starting in 1875, the government began to enact immigra-
tion restrictions, but statutes were explicitly adopted for refugees at the
end of World War II.60 World War II forced the United States to reevalu-
ate its immigration system, due to its failure to provide a solution for
many fleeing fascist European regimes.61 This led to an era of liberal im-
migration policy, which was more responsive to the victims of oppres-
sion.62 In 1950 the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) was created to help World War II refugees.63
In 1952, Congress created a specific statutory provision, the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), that gave the Attorney General
the authority to withhold deportation of an alien if the alien would be
subject to physical persecution.64 From the 1950s to 1980, foreign policy
openly dominated asylum determinations, and refugees fleeing Commu-
nist countries were favored.65 This would not be the first or the last time
that foreign policy would play a role in the refugee determination pro-
cess. In 1968, the U.S. became a party to the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol), which bound the U.S. to
the provisions of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Convention).66 The Protocol is an international treaty embod-
ying the essential provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention.67 The Con-
vention adopted a general definition of the term “refugee” to end the
25 (2016); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports for
Human Rights Practices for 2016: Liberia 28 (2016); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of De-
mocracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 2016: Sierra
Leone 12 (2016).
57. ACAPS, supra note 5, at 1, 3–6.
58. Id.
59. Maureen O’Connor Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present, and Future, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 995, 1000 (1992).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1001–02.
62. Id.
63. History of UNHCR, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/history-of-unhcr.html
[https://perma.cc/6R7Z-XKSS] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
64. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1524 (2012)).
65. O’Connor Hurley, supra note 59, at 1005–06.
66. Id. at 1006–08.
67. Anthony Asuncion, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a More Liberal
Asylum Standard, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 915, 922–23 (1988).
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practice of distinguishing between aliens on the basis of their national
origin.68 This prohibited the use of politics, race, convenience, or any of
many other conceivable considerations to justify distinguishing among
aliens facing objectively similar threats.69 Additionally, the Protocol
adopted a definition of “persecution” as a “threat to one’s life or free-
dom” and allowed a refugee to apply for asylum if he originally fled his
country because of persecution or if he is unable to return because perse-
cution has arisen since his departure.70 In its Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, the UNHCR states its hu-
manitarian principle as:
[A] person who–or whose family–has suffered under atrocious forms
of persecution should not be expected to repatriate. Even though
there may have been a change of regime in his country, this may not
always produce a complete change in the attitude of the population,
nor, in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee.71
This created a refugee status based on the idea of past persecution.72
Congress made no changes to conform to these Conventions, and do-
mestic policy continued to be inconsistent with international law until
Congress forced compliance with the Protocol when it passed the Refu-
gee Act of 1980.73 The Refugee Act of 1980 clearly defined the process
for asylum in the United States.74 To apply for asylum, the person must
qualify as a refugee and be present in the United States or at the border
seeking entry.75 Prior to the Refugee Act, the word “asylum” never ap-
peared in U.S. immigration laws, and the definition of “refugee” did not
match the UN Protocol definition.76 The Refugee Act finally incorpo-
rated international law standards and created a uniform process for
resolving asylum claims.77 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
the BIA, and federal courts of appeals play key roles in the asylum pro-
cess because they determine which applicants are eligible for asylum sta-
tus.78 The enactment of the Refugee Act furthered the “long held
perception of the United States as a haven for refugees escaping
oppression.”79
68. Sophie H. Pirie, The Need for a Codified Definition of Persecution in United States
Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187, 196 (1988).
69. Id.
70. Asuncion, supra note 67, at 923.
71. Rebecca H. Gutner, A Neglected Alternative: Toward a Workable Standard for Im-
plementing Humanitarian Asylum, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413, 417–18 (2006).
72. Id. at 417.
73. Asuncion, supra note 67, at 924–25.
74. Id. at 925.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 927.
77. Id. at 925.
78. Pirie, supra note 68, at 188.
79. Asuncion, supra note 67, at 926.
2018] Heal Thyself 1163
B. ASYLUM REQUIREMENTS AND PROCESS
Any alien who is physically present in the U.S. or at the U.S. border
may apply for asylum.80 This excludes aliens who may be removed to a
“safe third country”81 or those from countries where the circumstances
have changed.82 This also excludes those who themselves persecuted any
person on account of the protected characteristics, those convicted of a
particularly serious crime, or a serious non-political crime.83 To be eligi-
ble for asylum, the alien must meet the definition of refugee.84 A refugee
is:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
. . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.85
The purpose of the definition was to “give statutory meaning to our
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns” by
broadly defining the term and making it permissive.86 The burden of
proof is on the applicant to establish her status as a refugee by establish-
ing that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion was or will be the central reason for her perse-
cution.87 This can be accomplished through her own testimony, which is
persuasive and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate she is a
refugee, but may require corroboration, provided by the applicant if rea-
sonably possible, if the trier of fact doubts the credibility of the appli-
cant.88 The trier of fact may also rely on material provided by the State
Department, such as annual Country Reports, USCIS offices, or other
credible sources, such as international organizations, private voluntary
agencies, news organizations, or academic institutions.89 Credibility is de-
termined by the totality of the circumstances and is entirely up to the
discretion of the trier of fact.90
The requirements for asylum eligibility thus break down in the follow-
ing steps: (i) demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution, (ii) a “but
for” nexus between that persecution and a protected asylum ground, and
(iii) a lack of state protection, defined as either an inability or unwilling-
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012).
81. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
82. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
83. Id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).
84. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42) (2012).
85. Id.
86. Wendy B. Davis & Angela D. Atchue, No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying a
Safe Haven for Refugees, 5 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 81, 81 (2000) (citation omitted).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
88. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
89. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2017).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
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ness of the state to protect the asylum group.91 “The applicant may qual-
ify as a refugee either because . . . she has suffered past persecution or
because she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”92 Courts have
struggled to define the standards for “well-founded fear” and “persecu-
tion” as neither is defined by statute or regulation.93 Additionally, while
nearly all protected asylum grounds have an obvious meaning, member-
ship in a particular social group is the least well-defined and has the most
disparity among its decisions. The following sub-section discusses the con-
fusion surrounding the well-founded fear of persecution requirement, as
well as the troubling effects of discretion and appellate deference, before
tackling the ever-changing development of particular social group deter-
minations in Section V.
1. Persecution—Past, Present, and Future
Persecution, though the “fundamental concept at the core of the refu-
gee definition,”94 was never defined by the INA, regulations, or the
UNHCR Convention or Protocol.95 Therefore, the duty to define this
term has been left to the BIA and the federal courts of appeals.96 Though
this creates a lenient and permissive definition of persecution, it leads to
uncertainty in asylum decisions. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has noted
that a “more comprehensive definition of persecution would be benefi-
cial.”97 This leads to the enduring questions of what is persecution and
how much is enough. “If persecution is at the core of refugee protection,
then harm is at the core of persecution.”98 Therefore, harm is important
but is considered on a case by case basis. The harm required for persecu-
tion includes both the tangible and intangible, though the tangible is
often deemed more worthy and leads to a granting of asylum more often
than the intangible.99 Additionally, a single incident may sometimes be
enough to satisfy the requirements of persecution, and at other times it
may not.
The U.N. High Commissioner noted that while there is no universal
definition of persecution, “a threat to life or freedom on account of [the
protected grounds] is always persecution. Other serious violations of
human rights for the same reasons would also constitute persecution.”100
Regulations declare that an asylum applicant may qualify as a refugee if
she has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecu-
91. Jillian Blake, Getting to Group Under U.S. Asylum Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
ONLINE 167, 168 (2015).
92. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b).
93. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
94. Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 283 (2013).
95. A. Roman Boed, Past Persecution Standard for Asylum Eligibility in the Seventh
Circuit: Bygones are Bygones, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 157 (1993).
96. Rempell, supra note 94, at 283–84.
97. Id. at 286.
98. Id. at 292.
99. Id.
100. Boed, supra note 95, at 175 (emphasis added).
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tion.101 A well-founded fear of persecution is found if the applicant has a
fear of persecution in the country, there is a reasonable possibility that
she will suffer persecution upon return to that country, or she is unable or
unwilling to return to that country or avail herself of that country’s pro-
tections because of such fear.102 No well-founded fear of persecution will
be found if the person could have relocated within the country or could
have been “firmly resettled” elsewhere.103 This creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of a well-founded fear of persecution, which includes a fear of
future persecution, that may be rebutted if the trier of fact finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a fundamental
change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-
founded fear on account of the protected grounds or if the applicant
could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of her coun-
try of nationality, and it would be reasonable to expect that applicant to
do so.104 This provides the trier of fact with broad discretion to grant or
deny status as a refugee, and thus asylum. The trier of fact also has discre-
tion to grant asylum if the applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons
for being unwilling or unable to return to her country because of the se-
verity of the past persecution or if she has established that there is a rea-
sonable possibility that she may suffer other serious harm upon return to
that country.105
One of the reasons a trier of fact might choose to use his discretion to
deny an applicant asylum is based on whether there has been a “funda-
mental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a
well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant’s country.”106 As this is
up to the discretion of the trier of fact, changes in country conditions can
often be based on current politics, presidential goals, foreign policy, and
State Department Country Reports, which may fall prey to political
bias.107 At times, these biased sources confuse the reality of circum-
stances in native countries. State Department reports may declare that
crucial events are over when the country is still feeling the long-term ef-
fects of the event, which may still create persecution. The U.N. Protocol,
which is only a persuasive authority for U.S. courts and immigration law,
provides that “only a fundamental, durable change in conditions in the
applicant’s country of origin may remove the basis of an applicant’s fear
of persecution and thus deprive her of refugee status.”108
An additional consideration lies in harms that have been committed
and, in the mind of the trier of fact, may not be able to occur again. This
has been the argument against classifying Female Genital Mutilation
101. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2017).
102. Id. § 208.13(b)(2).
103. Id. § 208.13(b)(2)(C).
104. Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B).
105. Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)–(B).
106. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
107. Id. § 208.13(b)(2)(C).
108. Susannah C. Vance, An Enduring Fear: Recent Limitations on the Past Persecution
Ground for Asylum, 91 KY. L.J. 957, 998 (2003) (emphasis added).
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(FGM) as persecution.109 While those facing a risk of future FGM have
been classified as refugees and often granted asylum,110 many women
who have fled their countries after being subjected to past FGM have
been denied.111 These courts have argued that the “unrepeatable, one-
time act of FGM is the ‘fundamental change in circumstances’” that war-
rants mandatory denial of asylum.112 Currently, the courts of appeals are
split on the proper theoretical analysis of these types of claims.113 The
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have followed the Singular Harm The-
ory where FGM is viewed as a harm that can occur only once.114 There-
fore, since the harm cannot reoccur, courts often find this to be a
“fundamental change in circumstances,” so the presumption of a well-
founded fear of persecution has been rebutted and asylum is denied.115
This theory can also be combined with the decision to overlook broader
circumstances surrounding the decision not to return to one’s home coun-
try outside of the harm itself, such as a “prevalent culture of oppres-
sion.”116 Additionally, it ignores the fact that FGM can be repeated, and
often is, as well as the lifelong medical and psychological effects of the
procedure.
Next is the Continuing Persecution Theory, adopted by the Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which recognizes that a claim of past persecu-
tion and harm can provide a valid basis for asylum.117 Courts often make
this decision based on the “imbedded” oppressive culture of the nation
the applicant fears returning to.118 “The Second Circuit also supports the
notion that even if an act is considered a one-time harm, it cannot be used
to rebut the presumption” because the applicant “may still be at risk for
other acts of persecution based on the same grounds.”119 The Second and
Eighth Circuits agreed that nothing in the statute or regulatory
frameworks require the future threats to be the same form, act, or harm
109. See Smruti Govan, Recognizing the Need for Reform: Asylum Law Standards for
Victims of Past Female Genital Mutilation, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 379, 386 (2009).
110. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–68 (B.I.A. 1996).
111. Govan, supra note 109, at 380. FGM is a cultural practice and social convention
that involves the partial or total removal of the external female genitalia. See Female Geni-
tal Mutilation, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ [https://perma
.cc/7HWJ-EVMH] (last updated Jan. 2018). There are four types of FGM, each with vary-
ing degrees of removal; therefore, a woman subjected to a prior partial removal may be
subjected to further removal. Id. In countries where FGM is practiced, it is often per-
formed as a preparation for womanhood and marriage, as well as to ensure adherence to
cultural ideals of femininity, modesty, and cleanliness. Id. FGM is most commonly prac-
ticed by secret societies and performed outside of a healthcare facility. Id. FGM has no
health benefits and only leads to complications and health risks, such as infection,
problems urinating, complications during childbirth, and death. Id.
112. Govan, supra note 109, at 386.
113. Id. at 389–96.
114. Id. at 389–92.
115. Id. at 397.
116. Id. at 391.
117. Id. at 392–96.
118. Id. at 393.
119. Id. at 403.
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as the past persecution.120 This halts the argument that a “fundamental
change” has occurred when the one-time event has been conducted.
2. Discretion, Deference, and Disparities
Immigration judges and asylum officers may grant or deny asylum in
the exercise of their discretion.121 Therefore, an alien may qualify as a
refugee and establish a well-founded fear but still be denied asylum.
Looking back to persecution and the BIA’s decision in Matter of Chen,
the court is allowed discretion when analyzing whether a past persecution
claim can be the basis for the likelihood of present or future persecu-
tion.122 Additionally, the court said “there may be cases where the
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted for humanitarian reasons
even if there is little likelihood of future persecution” which often arises
out of “severe past persecution.”123 Often, discretion may be influenced
by political influences and biases.
Immigration judges’ resources are frequently limited and consist
mostly of government publications, though they may be presented with
information from human rights groups by a well-prepared and repre-
sented applicant.124 It has been noted that when the U.S. “was politically
allied with the country of the asylum applicant, the State Department
appeared to be blind to any documented human rights violations of that
country”—therefore, State Department Country Reports would be silent
on instances of persecution.125 Often, perceived changes in country con-
ditions, as reported in State Department reports, have led to the denial of
asylum.126 Judges are not currently “prohibited from making discretion-
ary rulings on the basis of foreign policy interests or political opinion.”127
Thus, discretion is problematic because it is vague, unsupported by facts,
and often denies relief to those fleeing persecution. As the standard of
review by circuit courts of BIA decisions is the abuse of discretion stan-
dard, overturning discretionary decisions is extremely difficult.128 This
discretionary system and its political motivations have turned the once
permissive asylum application process into one full of institutional
barriers.129
120. Id. at 402–03.
121. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(a)–(b) (2017).
122. Timothy P. McIlmail, Toward a More Reasonably Rebutted Presumption: A Propo-
sal to Amend the Past Persecution Asylum Regulation – 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(B)(1), 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 265, 269 (1998).
123. Id.
124. O’Connor Hurley, supra note 59, at 1034.
125. Id. at 1048.
126. Davis & Atchue, supra note 86, at 95.
127. Kathryn A. Dittrick Heebner, Protecting the Truly Persecuted: Restructuring the
Flawed Asylum System, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 549, 563 (2005).
128. Id. at 564; Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise of Discre-
tion in Claims for Asylum, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 595, 609 (2012).
129. Laura Isabel Bauer, They Beg for Our Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asylum
Law’s Failure to Protect Many of Today’s Refugees, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1084
(2004).
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IV. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
An additional barrier to asylum is satisfying the nexus or but-for re-
quirement. This requires the applicant to connect her past persecution or
well-founded fear of persecution to a protected ground under the defini-
tion of refugee.130 The least clearly defined and most difficult to satisfy
protected ground is membership in a particular social group.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND REQUIREMENTS
The definition of refugee was defined by the UN Protocol of 1951 to
include the five protected grounds; however, while the main four are eas-
ily defined, membership in a particular social group was not defined ex-
plicitly by either Congress or the Protocol.131 It is widely believed that
this protected ground was included in the definition as an afterthought.132
Therefore, defining particular social group has been the responsibility of
case law.
The first case to analyze the meaning and requirements of a particular
social group is Matter of Acosta, which recognized the absence of legisla-
tive history surrounding the term, as well as the UNHCR suggestion that
membership in a particular social group “connotes persons of similar
backgrounds, habits, or social status.”133 The court also held that persecu-
tion based on this ground may frequently overlap with other grounds.134
In Acosta, the BIA applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis135 and inter-
preted membership in a particular social group to mean “persecution that
is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared char-
acteristic might be an innate one . . . or in some circumstances it might be
a shared past experience . . . .”136 It also declared that the characteristic
that defines the group must be determined on a case by case basis.137 This
characteristic, being immutable, should be one that is “beyond the power
of an individual to change” or is “so fundamental to his identity or con-
science” that he cannot or should not be required to change.138 In this
way, Acosta equated the particular social group to the other grounds in
the INA.139 By 2000, all federal courts of appeals adopted this
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
131. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 233.
134. Id.
135. “Of the same kind, class, or nature. In statutory construction, the ‘ejusdem generis
rule’ is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.” Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1910).
136. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 234.
139. Id. at 233.
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standard.140
In 2002, the UNHCR published guidelines regarding particular social
group status which advocated for a disjunctive test.141 However, the
guidelines were and remain a more permissive standard than what the
United States has adopted over time. Its suggested standard for a particu-
lar social group was “a group of persons who share a common character-
istic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society.”142 Additionally, it recommended that particular social
group analysis should still be undertaken if an applicant alleges a social
group that is based on a characteristic that does not meet the Acosta stan-
dard.143 The guidelines advise that, while the category of particular social
group cannot be a catchall, there is no closed list of the groups which may
satisfy particular social group requirements and that the term “should be
read in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature
of groups in various societies and evolving international human rights
norms.”144 In 2000, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
promulgated a proposed regulation to attempt to define the requirements
for particular social groups.145 This regulation pulled from previous par-
ticular social group interpretation decisions and would have adopted the
Acosta standard and a list of non-exclusive relevant factors, which would
have incorporated factors that had previously divided Circuit Court
decisions.146
In 2008, the BIA decided two cases in which it rejected gang-based
asylum claims based on two new requirements—social visibility and par-
ticularity—which were added to the particular social group analysis.147
This means that a viable particular social group must be based on an im-
mutable characteristic and be both socially visible and particularly de-
fined.148 Particularity refers to the definition of the group “in a manner
sufficiently distinct” so that it “would be recognized . . . as a discrete class
of persons.”149 Therefore, the group cannot be “too amorphous . . . to
create a benchmark for determining group membership” and must be de-
fined with clear and objective words or be narrow and homogenous.150
Years later, the BIA clarified “social visibility” not as a literal standard
but as “social distinction” where groups must be easily recognized and
140. Applying for Asylum, supra note 7.
141. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular so-
cial group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Proto-
col relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Guidelines on International Protection], http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf.
142. Id. at ¶ 11.
143. Id. at ¶ 2.
144. Id. at ¶ 3.
145. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000).
146. Id.
147. Applying for Asylum, supra note 7.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 584 (B.I.A. 2008)).
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perceived in society.151 Additionally, these decisions included troubling
dicta about particularity, finding that a group failed because it “could in-
clude persons of any age, sex, or background,” despite previously stating
that groups need not be homogenous.152 This left open questions as the
new test seemed to confuse prior decisions’ accepted particular social
groups that would no longer be viable. Currently, all courts of appeals
have adopted these additional requirements153 except for the Ninth,154
the Seventh,155 and the Third.156
B. CURRENT LAW AND DISPARITIES
Even those circuits that have adopted the social distinction and particu-
larity requirements feature slight differences in their interpretation and
application.157 This has often led to conflicting BIA and circuit prece-
dent.158 The BIA has a long-standing policy of following circuit precedent
in any case arising within that circuit.159 Most significantly, the two cir-
cuits that have most strongly criticized the additional requirements—the
Third and the Seventh—have yet to recognize the BIA decisions that cre-
ated that test as binding.160 Obvious disparities within the courts’ deci-
sions and analysis of asylum claims have drawn the attention of not only
the immigration law community but widespread media. The New York
Times published an article in 2007, which shed light on a study conducted
by three law professors who analyzed 140,000 immigration judge deci-
sions and found vast differences in the handling and the outcomes of
cases, some with comparable factual circumstances.161 The study said that
the difference in the outcome of the case could come from the random
assignment of a case to a particular judge.162 The study found that some-
one who has fled China seeking asylum in immigration court in Orlando,
Florida, has a 76% chance of success, while the same refugee would have
a 7% change in Atlanta, Georgia.163 Additionally, the study found dispar-
ities among judges sitting in the same court and hearing similar asylum
151. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 236 (B.I.A. 2014).
152. Id.
153. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558
F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir. 2008);
Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen.,
446 F.3d 1190, 1198–99 (11th Cir. 2006).
154. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667–68 (9th Cir. 2010).
155. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2009); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d
426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
156. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603–04 (3d Cir. 2011).
157. Applying for Asylum, supra note 7.
158. Id.
159. In re K-S-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 715, 718 (B.I.A. 1993).
160. Applying for Asylum, supra note 7.
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cases.164
Undoubtedly, these disparities are due not only to judges’ personal
opinions or experience, but also due to the different approaches adopted
by the BIA and courts of appeals. According to research done by TRAC
at Syracuse University, asylum decision disparity has increased in most
immigration courts since the publishing of the New York Times article.165
Twelve of the sixteen courts surveyed had at least a 27% increase in deci-
sion disparity.166
Due to its seat in California, the Ninth Circuit is the most active federal
court reviewing asylum decisions.167 It is thought to be more progressive,
however, its differences with the BIA have only contributed to the confu-
sion within asylum law.168 While it originally adopted the new factors, it
now considers them as “factor(s) to consider” rather than require-
ments.169 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the BIA’s social
distinction requirement because it has been inconsistent in its deci-
sions.170 The court equates this requirement to “pinning a target [on the
applicants’] backs” to identify themselves as being a member of a particu-
lar social group.171 The court found this criterion to be implausible be-
cause members of a targeted group often “take pains to avoid being
socially visible.”172 The Seventh Circuit also rejected the particularity re-
quirement.173 The Third Circuit has also found these requirements prob-
lematic because they are inconsistent with BIA precedent, and the BIA
has failed to give a “principled reason” for these new requirements.174
1. Particular Social Groups Recognized—Relief for Some
Some particular social groups that have been recognized using the
Acosta definition are persecuted or targeted families,175 socially distin-
guishable clans,176 women not yet subject to FGM,177 the LGBT commu-
nity,178 Cameroonian widows,179 and Christian women who oppose
Islamic garb.180 Family, clan membership, and “kinship ties” have been
164. Id.
165. Asylum Outcome Increasingly Depends on Judge Assigned, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(Dec. 2, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/447/ [https://perma.cc/Y78J-HJTK].
166. Id.
167. O’Connor Hurley, supra note 59, at 1022, n.236.
168. Id. at 1022.
169. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010).
170. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
171. Id. at 616.
172. Id. at 615.
173. Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430–31 (7th Cir. 2009).
174. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3rd Cir. 2011).
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found to be “paradigmatically immutable . . . innate and unchange-
able.”181 As mentioned previously, young women who have not yet been
subject to FGM have been found to be a particular social group because
the characteristics of being a young woman and having intact genitalia are
“so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman.”182 Finally,
the “westernized” person has been widely accepted by courts as a “cogni-
zable social group” because the group is visible and specific in society due
to the group’s refusal to conform to social norms.183 Courts have found
this group to be sufficiently narrow.184
2. Particular Social Groups Denied—A Confusing Collection
The groups that have been rejected particular social group status have
some obvious reasons for rejection and some that are extremely unclear.
These groups include confidential informants,185 young men who refuse
recruitment into gangs,186 and those defined solely by broad characteris-
tics, such as youth, gender, poverty, and homelessness.187 Broadly defined
groups and groups that are not visible, like confidential informants,
clearly fail to meet the standards for a particular social group. The Ninth
Circuit formulated a particular social group spectrum with “immediate
members of a certain family” as the prototypical particular social group
and a “class of young, urban, working-class males of military age who are
politically neutral” as lacking the cohesive homogeneity required.188 The
courts fear that allowing a group defined by broad characteristics will
open the doors of asylum to all members of a gender, profession, or
class.189
V. CONSTRUCTING A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP FOR
THE HEALTHCARE WORKERS OF THE 2014
WEST AFRICAN EBOLA OUTBREAK
As healthcare workers who fled their countries for the U.S. begin to
apply for asylum, membership in a particular social group will be the only
protected ground under which they can apply. Since achieving particular
social group status remains elusive due to inconsistent case law, the nega-
tive influence of political bias on decision-making, and insecurity about
the meaning and requirements of a particular social group, constructing a
particular social group for these healthcare workers will be nearly impos-
181. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011).
182. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996).
183. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 605; Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993).
184. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
185. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).
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563 F.3d 855, 861 (9th Cir. 2009).
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sible without consistent, humanitarian-focused decisions regarding the re-
quirements for recognizing a particular social group. Additionally, by
adopting the Continuing Persecution Theory, these healthcare workers
may be able to construct a valid particular social group based on unbiased
country conditions.
A. SATISFYING THE ELEMENTS AND ARGUING FOR CHANGE
1. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Though persecution lacks definition, much of the precedent shows that
persecution: (1) is a threat to life or freedom; (2) is defined by harms,
both tangible and intangible; (3) can be a feature, but not the only, defin-
ing feature, of the particular social group; and (4) can be based on past
persecution suffered by the applicant. Past persecution will be found if
the applicant establishes they have suffered a persecution in the past on
the basis of protected grounds and is unable or unwilling to return or
avail herself of the protection of her country, creating a presumption of a
fear of future persecution.190 However, the persecution must (1) be
targeted toward the group and not society at large, and (2) be either con-
tinuous or serious enough to afford the applicant with well-founded fear.
When constructing a particular social group, the harms faced must be
analyzed to see if they meet the definition of persecution.191 The ability
of the asylum seeker to avail the protection of the native country must
also be considered.192 Looking at the harms faced by the West African
healthcare workers, they and their hospitals were the targets of threats
and violence during and for some time after the outbreak.193 Local
healthcare providers, burial workers, and international health agencies
were targets of threats and violence due to a societal fear that they had
brought the disease with them. Threats of violence included meeting
healthcare workers at the edge of town with rocks, machetes, and guns.194
Episodes of minor violence included the throwing of rocks at healthcare
or burial workers and damaging medical vehicles.195 Often violence was
focused on the healthcare institutions, like the burning of a health clinic
because locals feared it was working to spread the disease, or mob vio-
lence at another health clinic. Serious violence, like the mass assassina-
tion of a healthcare delegation attempting to raise Ebola awareness, also
occurred.196 Undoubtedly, these were cases of retributive violence be-
cause healthcare workers were blamed for the deaths of family members
or for breaking health and burial traditions. This group faced harms, both
tangible and intangible, that threatened their lives and freedom.
190. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2017).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. McCoy, supra note 50; Wilson, supra note 50; Attacks on Health Facilities, supra
note 13; Armed Men Attack, supra note 54.
194. See supra note 193.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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The next step in the analysis is the inability of the state to provide or
offer protection from this persecution.197 Each country affected in the
2014 outbreak is well-known internationally for the corruption and ineffi-
cacy of its police.198 Though police were ordered to protect hospitals dur-
ing the outbreak, violence against these healthcare workers continued.
This shows an inability of those in this group to avail themselves of the
protection of their country.199 Therefore, because these groups have
demonstrated that they have been persecuted against and cannot avail
themselves of the protections of their country, they have a presumption
of a well-founded fear of future persecution.200
Though an argument may be raised that, due to the ending of the
Ebola outbreak, there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances”
that rebuts this presumption, international groups note the continuing so-
cial stigma against healthcare workers and those involved in the Ebola
crisis.201 Threats of violence still exist and programs have been put in
place to dispel the social stigma still faced by healthcare workers and bur-
ial workers.202 Additionally, enduring distrust of Western medicine and
Western medicine practitioners continues.203
In spite of this overwhelming evidence, political bias and judicial dis-
parity may yet act as a barrier to refuting the argument of change in cir-
cumstances. Considering the current political climate surrounding
immigration204 and the rise of American nationalistic views,205 this bar-
rier may be even greater. A solution to these anti-humanitarian barriers
would be to follow the lead of international opinions like that of the
UNHCR, which refuses to reject applicants based on their country of ori-
gin and only recognizes a change in condition when there has been a
“fundamental, durable change.”206 An additional solution would be to
require a more in-depth analysis of current country conditions outside of
U.S. State Department reports, which may fall prey to political bias.
Similar to refuting arguments that have been raised for women sub-
jected to FGM, it can be argued that this persecution is ongoing and can
be repeated even in the absence of the outbreak.207 Looking at the Single
Harm Theory, which is obviously short-sighted, the argument against
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
198. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 1, 172–74, 318–20.
199. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
200. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2017).
201. ACAPS, supra note 5, at 1, 4–6.
202. Id.
203. Washington, supra note 9.
204. Eli Watkins & Abby Phillip, Trump Decries Immigrants from “Shithole Countries”
Coming to US, CNN (Jan. 12, 2018, 9:53 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/politics/im
migrants-shithole-countries-trump [http://perma.cc/5TWH-JD8C].
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TON POST (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-solution-to-
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group status for these healthcare workers would be that the circum-
stances surrounding the harm—the 2014 Ebola crisis—have ended.208
However, the harm faced by healthcare workers during the Ebola crisis
did not and will not end simply because the 2014 Ebola outbreak
ended.209
Additionally, current country condition reports, including those from
the State Department, report continuing violence and stigma against
these healthcare workers up to the last two years.210 Therefore, the Con-
tinuing Persecution Theory would provide the most logical analysis of the
harm faced by this group.211 Under this theory, though the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak ended, the persecution faced by these healthcare workers can
continue based on the current conditions of the country.212 Additionally,
the future threats of persecution they face, though related to their mem-
bership in the group, can be in a different form than the ones they faced
previously.213
2. The Nexus Requirement—Constructing a Valid Particular Social
Group
Even if this group can satisfy the persecution requirement, the greatest
difficulty arises in establishing these healthcare workers as a valid partic-
ular social group. Under current U.S. asylum law, a particular social
group must (1) share an immutable characteristic, (2) be socially visible
or distinct, and (3) be particular.214 However, as mentioned previously,
even these requirements have not been uniformly followed by asylum of-
ficers, immigration judges, and courts of appeals.215 Even the strongest
arguments focused on distinguishing this group from invalid particular so-
cial groups and comparing it to valid particular social groups would lead
to disparate results.216 Therefore, utilizing the UNHCR unified-disjunc-
tive analysis would yield the strongest and most consistent analysis of a
particular social group. This analysis adopts a single standard that incor-
porates both the Acosta immutable characteristic and the social visibility
requirements.217 Under the UNHCR’s definition,
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a com-
mon characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who
are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be
one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental
208. ACAPS, supra note 5, at 1, 3–6.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
211. Govan, supra note 109, at 387.
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to identity, conscience [,] or the exercise of one’s human rights . . . . If
a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic de-
termined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis
should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless
perceived as a cognizable group in that society.218
This provides multiple opportunities for a group to be analyzed as valid
under both standards. Additionally, the UNHCR standards specifically
allow persecution to be a relevant factor in the definition and visibility of
a group.219 UNHCR standards also do not require groups to be cohesive
or particular, instead focusing solely on whether there is a common ele-
ment shared by group members.220 The following sections will address
each requirement in turn and analyze how each would be handled under
current U.S. immigration law and the UNHCR standards.
a. Common, Immutable Characteristic
There are three “common” or “immutable” characteristics shared by
these healthcare workers: (1) Western medical knowledge or training, (2)
being a former healthcare worker during the Ebola outbreak, and (3) be-
ing threatened with violence or being a victim of the violence that
emerged from the fear of Western medicine. First, in Rojas-Contreras v.
Attorney General of the U.S., the Third Circuit held that the BIA should
consider whether the claim of healthcare providers who “possess special-
ized knowledge and expertise” and medical knowledge that cannot be
changed or rid of would qualify as immutable characteristics.221 The
knowledge and training possessed by these healthcare workers are simi-
larly immutable and deserves to be considered by the courts as a com-
mon, immutable characteristic.
Second, courts have held that employment alone is not an immutable
characteristic because it can be ended at any time without disturbing a
fundamental characteristic.222 However, courts have held that former em-
ployment cannot be changed and is, therefore, an appropriate immutable
characteristic for a particular social group.223 This characteristic is immu-
table because a person cannot cease to be a former employee, this is a
group they will always be a part of. Conversely, the UNHCR definition of
common characteristic defines it as “one which is innate, unchangeable,
or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience [,] or the exer-
cise of one’s human right.”224 This definition differs from the current U.S.
definition because it adds the exercising of a human right as a factor. The
right to employment or work has long been considered a human right.225
218. Id. at ¶¶ 11–12 (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at ¶¶ 14–15.
220. Id.
221. Rojas-Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 188 Fed. App’x 121, 125 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Therefore, under the UNHCR standard, employment and former em-
ployment may be considered a valid common, immutable characteristic.
Finally, though the harm faced by a group cannot be the sole defining
factor of the particular social group, both current U.S. asylum law and the
UNHCR standards allow the harm faced to be one of the defining factors
of the group.226 Therefore, the common threat or realization of violence
because of their roles in treating the Ebola crisis might be considered a
factor when analyzing common, immutable characteristics. Utilizing cur-
rent U.S. asylum law and judicial precedent, the outcome on this factor is
unclear. Differences in circuit opinion make predicting outcomes virtually
impossible. However, under the UNHCR, even if this group is found to
not have a common, immutable characteristic, it still has a chance to sat-
isfy the requirements of a particular social group.
b. Social Visibility/Distinction
Social visibility or distinction is the second required factor under cur-
rent U.S. asylum law and an alternate factor under the UNHCR. Because
it requires a showing that the group is distinct or visible in the applicant’s
home country, there must be evidence to prove this group’s perceptibility
in their native society. As previously mentioned, Western medicine and
its suppliers have a long history of distrust in Africa.227 Countless media
outlets228 and international relief and humanitarian groups229 recognized
that these healthcare workers were targeted and persecuted because of
their known identification and employment as healthcare workers. Like
women who have not been subjected to FGM230 and Christian or West-
ern women in Islamic countries,231 these healthcare workers would be
readily distinguishable in their society because their Western methods
defy tradition. Therefore, under the UNHCR analysis, this group
achieves valid particular social group status, even if it is not found to
share a common, immutable characteristic. Under current U.S. law, the
group must still satisfy the final requirement of particularity.
c. Particularity
Particularity, as shown by the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of a “class of
young, urban, working-class males of military age who are politically neu-
tral,” focuses on the members of the group.232 Groups defined too
broadly are seen to lack particularity;233 therefore, the more homogenous
226. UNHCR, supra note 141, at ¶ 10.
227. Washington, supra note 9.
228. Attacks on Health Facilities, supra note 49; Emergencies Preparedness, supra note
13.
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and cohesive a group, the more likely it is to be particular. Since the vio-
lence experienced by those involved in the Ebola outbreak targeted
healthcare and medical aid workers, this was not so diffuse as to make it
wide-spread persecution across a beleaguered country. However, this
group may not meet the particularity requirement because groups which
include multiple races, genders, and backgrounds of people have not
been considered valid. Since this group might include both local and in-
ternational healthcare workers, men and women, the young and the old,
and people in different fields of work in healthcare, the group’s validity
may be destroyed.
This again shows the superiority of the UNHCR’s approach, which
would consider this group valid based on its common characteristic or its
social distinction. This approach has rejected the requirement of a “cohe-
sive” or particular group and has also refused to deny a group based on
its size.234 This approach is not argued to be permissive and make the
particular social group a catchall category. It is meant to further the pur-
pose of asylum law that has been integral since its inception: protecting
human rights.
3. Advancing Several Formulations
Unfortunately, immigration judges and asylum officers still have the
discretion to grant or deny asylum, which has been known to be arbi-
trary.235 Therefore, a final method for meeting the particular social group
requirements comes from the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Cece v.
Holder.236 This holding recognized the ability to “advance several formu-
lations of the ‘particular social group’ at issue.”237 This allows an appli-
cant multiple opportunities to sufficiently articulate her group to meet
the requirements of asylum. Therefore, a group made up of Western Afri-
can healthcare workers who were persecuted against during the Ebola
Crisis of 2014 because of their membership as healthcare workers can be
reformulated in varying ways to satisfy particular social group require-
ments. This can be done by limiting the scope of the group to the specific
countries affected to satisfy the particularity requirement. For example,
the group could be limited to specific types of jobs (doctor, nurse, burial
workers), or, because harm can be a defining factor of a group, to specific
situations of persecutory harm. This can also be achieved by clarifying
that these healthcare workers practice Western medicine, as opposed to
traditional versions. Since there is such an enduring distrust against West-
ern medicine and its proponents in traditional African culture, this would
undoubtedly satisfy the social distinction/visibility requirement.238
234. UNHCR, supra note 141, at ¶ 10–12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Though the Ebola outbreak has ended, the persecution, stigma, and
violence suffered by healthcare workers continue. Additionally, studies
show that violence toward healthcare workers has increased internation-
ally, mostly in places facing conflict or political unrest,239 and that the
public’s trust in doctors and medicine is waning.240 The most recent at-
tacks closely mirror those experienced by the healthcare workers during
the Ebola crisis: destruction and looting of hospitals and clinics; intimida-
tion, assault, and killing of healthcare workers; obstruction of access to
healthcare, and blockage of humanitarian actors.241 Because they have
faced and continue to face clear and demonstrable persecution that has
been well-documented in both mainstream media and country condition
reports, healthcare workers satisfy the well-founded fear of persecution
requirement for asylum. However, this is contingent upon judicial discre-
tion influenced by prejudice and political bias.
These healthcare workers meet the status of a particular social group
because they are members of a highly trained and intelligent class who
possess medical knowledge, which they cannot leave behind as easily as
one could leave a job. Though their group may include a variety of gen-
ders and professions, it is sufficiently particular because the group is re-
stricted to this single outbreak in this region of the world. Additionally, it
is socially distinct because of the widespread knowledge and distrust of
those who work in Western medicine in Africa. Regardless of these un-
clear, divergent requirements, these healthcare workers and many other
proposed groups would meet the status of a particular social group under
the UNHCR guidelines, which are followed widely in international immi-
gration law. Thus, if the U.S. is to be held to its humanitarian goals, it
should dispel its political bias, excessive judicial deference, and conflict-
ing decisions, and instead adopt the UNHCR disjunctive approach and
apply precedential decisions to future particular social groups.
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